Germany

The German government is decelerating rather than accelerating climate action, drifting further off track from the Climate Change Act's legally binding emissions reduction targets for 2030 and 2045. The government has so far failed to use the global fossil energy crisis to expedite Germany’s energy transition. On the contrary, latest policy decisions risk slowing the expansion of renewable energy deployment, which reached a relatively high level of 60% share in electricity generation due to previous government action. Germany was a key proponent of the EU's decision in 2026 to weaken the region's climate policies, both on the transition to zero emission cars and allowing the use of international carbon credits to meet targets For two years in a row, the CAT’s emissions projections for 2030 are now again higher than the previous update. The CAT continues to rate Germany’s climate action as “Insufficient”.

Overall, Germany has a well-developed climate policy framework with legally binding climate targets, including a legally binding commitment to reach climate neutrality by 2045, underpinned by stringent national policies and reinforced by EU regulation. Nevertheless, the target framework is still short of being 1.5°C compatible.

Germany’s government, made up of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Social Democratic Party (SPD), has recently deprioritised and weakened climate policy across most sectors. As a result, the CAT forecasts emissions to be higher in 2030 than previously estimated. The government’s Climate Action Programme, published in March 2026, relies on optimistic assumptions about existing and planned emissions reductions measures.

Even the government’s own Council of Experts on Climate Change (ERK) found that current policies and actions are not strong enough to achieve Germany’s emission reductions targets for 2030 and 2045. By failing to meet its legally binding targets, the government risks both legal action and financial liabilities to the EU that could reach tens of billions of euros.

Despite the US-Israel war on Iran driving up fossil gas prices and highlighting Germany’s fossil fuel import vulnerability, the government has yet to implement more ambitious energy transition policies.

The German government has mainly proposed and adopted measures that slow the energy transition and, as a result, lead to a slower emissions decline as previously estimated. Notably, many of these measures have not yet been fully factored into the government’s emissions projections:

• Expanding support for fossil gas: the parliament approved a law to introduce 9 GW of new fossil gas-fired power capacity by 2031 and authorised licences for new gas fields in the North Sea. It also reduced fossil gas prices by moving a gas storage levy to be paid by general taxes, rather than being added to the gas retail price.
• Reducing support for renewable energy: the government has increased uncertainty around federal support for renewable energy, which will likely slow buildout. The cabinet, but not yet the parliament, approved regulations to scale back solar subsidies and to make renewable energy purchases conditional on grid capacity.
• Slowing the decarbonisation of transport: the government retracted its predecessor's electric vehicle (EV) sales target, lobbied to weaken the compliance rules for carmakers that do not meet EU emissions performance standards and pushed to repeal the EU’s 2035 phase-out target for internal combustion engine vehicles. At the same time, the government has implemented measures to incentivise passenger car use and ownership. It also temporarily reduced the fuel tax for diesel and petrol to cope with high prices due to the fossil energy crisis at a cost of EUR 1.6bn.
• Repealing the previous government’s Buildings Energy Act: the previous act sought to phase out oil and fossil gas in new building heating systems, rapidly scale renewables in heating and ultimately reach GHG-neutrality for heating by 2045. The new act favours the use of biofuels, delaying the transition to low-carbon technologies, such as heat pumps. The government is also pushing to delay the EU carbon price for buildings.
• Using international carbon credits to meet Germany’s emission reductions targets: with an agreement in the German government’s coalition contract, Germany initiated the EU discussion to use carbon credits from outside the EU under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement. It marks a major step backwards for German climate action and ambition. By using Article 6, the government can shift its responsibility for emissions reductions to other countries, weakening domestic climate action and failing to generate additional global emissions reductions.

It is also of concern that Germany is set to exceed the target of the EU’s Effort Sharing Regulation (ESR), which sets legally binding emission limits for the transport and buildings sectors. Without further action, Germany will cumulatively exceed its 2030 target by at least 255 MtCO₂e between 2021 and 2030, up from an estimated 224 MtCO₂e year ago, and up from 126 MtCO₂e two years ago. Failing to meet this limit would require Germany to purchase offset certificates. This overshoot will be expensive; if certificates are each priced at EUR 100 per tonne of CO₂, this gap in emission reductions would cost German taxpayers EUR 25bn.

Across all sectors, Germany could make significant policy improvements to meet its domestic targets and to strive towards a Paris-compatible emissions reductions trajectory:

• Raise climate ambition: the government has not increased its 2030 emissions reductions target. Not only does the government need to meet its current target, it is also obliged under the Paris Agreement to increase the target’s ambition, which is still not 1.5˚C compatible. Germany, as one of the world's richest countries, has both the capacity and the responsibility to pursue much more ambitious climate action. A broad range of proven emission reductions measures has yet to be implemented: dismantling environmentally harmful subsidies (including, but not limited to, Germany’s diesel subsidy, company car subsidy, commuter allowance, flight travel discounts, agricultural diesel subsidy), raising the CO₂ price with socially differentiated compensation, establishing highway speed limits, introducing taxes on internal combustion engines with subsidies for small electric cars, setting a fossil gas phase-out target and charging full value added tax on animal products.
• Use the special debt-financed funds for climate: the government has yet to leverage the special debt-financed funds for infrastructure and climate action (“Sondervermögen”), which total EUR 500bn over 12 years. Transparent spending rules would be needed to channel funds towards supporting the transition to climate neutrality and avoid investments with a high emissions lock-in. There is a significant risk that the funds might be diverted to cover shortfalls in the general federal budget rather than being used for new and additional infrastructure and climate investments.
• Focus on social compensation: government’s climate policy portfolio only marginally includes the energy transition’s social dimension. Positive elements include the introduction of socially differentiated incentives for EVs, the extension of Germany’s nationwide public transit ticket and the support for new climate-friendly affordable housing developments. However, there is a lack of socially differentiated support for rising CO₂ prices. The use of the EU Social Climate Fund is also delayed. Key climate subsidies are likely to accrue mainly to higher-income households, particularly homeowners, rather than targeting those most in need of support.

Although the government has generally deprioritised climate action, several positive policy developments can be noted:

• EV purchase subsidy: the government introduced a socially differentiated subsidy for electric vehicles in January 2026. The incentive targets small EVs and is higher for vulnerable households.
• Contracts for difference in industry: the previous government introduced Carbon Contracts for Difference (CCfDs) to support companies in emissions-intensive industries, especially in steel, cement and chemical production, to make additional investments into zero carbon technologies. The current government initiated the second round of bidding.

The CAT rates each country’s targets and policies against (1) its fair share contribution to climate change mitigation considering a range of equity principles including responsibility, capability and equality, and (2) what is technically and economically feasible using modelled domestic pathways which, in absence of a better method, are based on global least-cost climate change mitigation.

Comparing a country’s fair share ranges and modelled domestic pathways provides insights into which governments should provide climate finance and which should receive it. Developed countries with large responsibility for historical emissions and high per-capita emissions, must not only implement ambitious climate action domestically but must also support climate action in developing countries with lower historical responsibility, capability, and lower per-capita emissions.

The CAT rates Germany’s overall climate targets, policies and finance as “Insufficient”, a rating that indicates Germany’s climate policies and commitments need substantial improvements to be consistent with the Paris Agreement’s 1.5°C temperature limit.

We rate Germany’s 2030 emissions reduction target as “Almost sufficient” when compared to modelled emissions pathways, consistent with 2°C of warming, and “Insufficient” when compared with its fair-share contribution to climate action. Germany should both further increase its emissions reduction target and provide significantly more and predictable finance to other countries to meet its fair-share contribution.

To achieve its target, Germany needs to enhance its policies and actions. It claims that it will achieve its 2030 target with current legislation, but our assessment, supported by other independent analysis, finds that it will miss it.

We rate Germany’s policies and actions until 2030 “Almost sufficient” when compared to modelled domestic pathways. We project that implemented policies and actions will lead to emissions reductions of between 61–63% below 1990 levels by 2030 excl. LULUCF. This represents a downward revision compared to last year’s estimate of 62–64% and still falls short of Germany’s 2030 target of at least 65% reduction below 1990 levels.

The German government’s climate agenda will likely undermine existing emission reduction efforts. The previous government, which had been in power since 2021, significantly accelerated climate policy implementation. Nevertheless, the previous government’s policies and actions were still insufficient to reach the government’s climate targets. Given that the current government is weakening existing policies across all sectors, Germany’s climate targets will likely be even further out of reach.

The government is compromising existing emission reduction efforts in the energy, transport, and buildings sectors by repealing existing regulation, rescinding emissions reductions targets, and building new fossil fuel-fired energy infrastructure. Further challenging emission reduction efforts is that Germany's forests are no longer a net sink of emissions but are now a net source. Its forest sink capacity was a key component of the government’s plan for reaching climate neutrality by 2045.

As a result, the 2030 target is even more difficult to achieve in comparison to the CAT’s assessment in 2025. Nevertheless, the Federal Environment Agency (UBA) claims that the cumulative emissions target from 2021 to 2030 will be achieved, but only because of overachievement in the COVID-19 pandemic. Germany's emissions level in 2030 is projected to be above the 2030 target.

The previous government weakened the Climate Change Act in May 2024, by replacing the compliance mechanism for binding sectoral emissions reductions targets with the ability for sectors to compensate for each other, as long as the overall target is met.

The Act’s amendment conceals the fact that the transport and buildings sectors will exceed their 2030 targets. It will be almost impossible for the transport sector to catch up after 2030 without drastic and disruptive measures. Significant compensation from the other sectors will also not be possible after 2030, as it will become increasingly difficult for sectors to reduce any additional tonnes of CO₂.

The full policies and action analysis can be found here.

We rate Germany’s 2030 reduction target of 65% below 1990 levels as “Almost sufficient” when compared to modelled emissions pathways. The “Almost sufficient” rating indicates that Germany’s proposed reduction target in 2030 is not yet consistent with the 1.5°C temperature limit but could be with moderate improvements, if strengthened to 70%.

If all countries were to follow Germany’s approach, warming could be held at—but not well below—2°C. While this target represents a significant improvement compared to its previous target, Germany’s new target is not stringent enough to limit warming to 1.5°C and needs further improvement.

The CAT’s assessment of Germany’s total fair share contribution takes into account its emissions reduction target and its climate finance.

We rate Germany’s 2030 target of 65% below 1990 levels excl. LULUCF as “Insufficient” when compared with its fair share emissions allocation. The “Insufficient” rating indicates that Germany’s target in 2030 and its climate finance contribution needs substantial improvements to be consistent with the 1.5°C temperature limit when compared to its fair share.

Germany should both further increase its emissions reduction target and provide significantly more and predictable finance to others to meet its fair-share contribution. Germany’s target is at the least stringent end of what would be a fair share of global effort, and is not consistent with the 1.5°C limit, unless other countries make much deeper reductions and comparably greater effort. If all countries were to follow Germany’s approach, warming would reach over 2°C and up to 3°C.

Germany’s international public climate finance contributions are better than most developed countries but still rated "Insufficient." Germany has committed to increase its climate finance, but contributions to date have been low compared to its fair share as assessed by the CAT.

To improve its rating, Germany needs to increase its international climate finance contributions in the order of factor of three, and, most urgently, stop funding fossil fuels abroad. At COP26, Germany signed a declaration to stop financing fossil fuels abroad, but later pushed to undo this decision. The CAT rates Germany’s international climate finance “Insufficient”.

Germany’s climate finance is not sufficient to improve the fair share rating, and the CAT rates Germany’s overall fair share contribution as “Insufficient”.

In June 2021, Germany adopted its 2045 net zero target in its revised Climate Change Act. The net zero target generally covers key elements but fails to meet good practice standards for some of them.

We evaluate the net zero target as: “Average.” The German government needs to legislate its commitments to include international aviation and shipping emissions and undertake planning on how to reach the 2045 target to improve its rating to “Acceptable”.