China

China has sustained momentum in its clean energy transition across power and end-use sectors, for the first time it is now structurally reducing emissions. In best-case policy projections, emissions are expected to fall further by 2035 than previously anticipated. While this is a positive development, China’s overall emissions trajectories remain misaligned with a 1.5°C pathway. The CAT’s overall rating for China’s policies and targets remains “Highly insufficient.”

Driven by cumulative structural shifts in China’s economy, emissions may have peaked in 2025 and at lower levels than expected last year. From March 2024 through the end of 2025, monthly CO₂ emissions were flat or declining. Rapid renewable deployment has begun to outpace electricity demand growth, reducing reliance on coal-fired generation, while electric vehicles surpassed a 50% market share in 2025, curbing oil demand and transport emissions.

In the industrial sector, declining outputs in cement and steel have continued to reduce overall emissions, but the chemical sector stands out as a notable exception. There, rising demand for plastics, alongside reduced coal use in power generation and declining coal prices, has driven a rapid expansion of the highly carbon intensive coal-to-chemicals industry, offsetting emission reduction gains elsewhere.

Coal trends reveal a structural contradiction. While coal-fired power generation declined in 2025 for the first time in a decade, 291 GW of new capacity remains in the pipeline, raising the risk of carbon lock-in and stranded assets. Excess coal supply has been partly absorbed by the expansion of coal-to-chemicals, which drove a 12% increase in the sector’s CO₂ emissions in 2025.

The CAT estimates China’s GHG emissions stabilised in 2025 at 14.8 GtCO₂e (excl. LULUCF), and projects total absolute emissions at 13.7-14.4 GtCO₂e in 2030 and 11.2-14.2 GtCO₂e in 2035. This represents an additional 4-6% reduction in emissions compared to our previous assessment. We have derived current policy projections (CPP) in two scenarios: conservative and optimistic. Details are provided in the Assumptions tab.

• In the conservative scenario, China’s emissions are projected to decline with an average annual reduction of 0.5% through 2035, reaching 4% below peak levels by 2035. Coal and oil consumption are projected to decline by around 6% by 2030. Natural gas, despite accounting for only about 10% of total energy demand, is expected to grow by roughly 23%, reflecting its role as a “transitional fuel” in China’s energy strategy.
• In the optimistic scenario, faster renewable deployment aligned with the 15th FYP target of doubling non-fossil energy supply drives a steeper emissions decline of 2.7% per year. Coal and oil consumption fall more decisively, by 13% and 8% respectively by 2030, while gas growth moderates to around 20%. This pathway delivers a substantially deeper transition, resulting in emissions levels about 20% lower by 2035 compared to the conservative scenario.

China has overachieved its 2030 NDC targets for renewable energy capacity and forest stock volume in 2024 and remains on track to meet its targets of a 65% reduction in carbon intensity from 2005 levels and a 25% non-fossil share of total energy consumption under current policies. The 2035 NDC, released in November 2025, commits to reducing economy-wide net GHG emissions by 7–10% from peak levels by 2035 and extends targets for renewable energy capacity and non-fossil energy share. It implies an emissions level of 13.7 GtCO₂e (excl. LULUCF), which the CAT assesses as achievable under our optimistic CPP scenario, but requires additional policy measures under a conservative scenario.

China’s 15th Five-Year Plan, released in March 2026, adopts a more cautious approach by setting a 17% carbon intensity reduction target for 2030, lowered from the previous 18% goal after it was missed. The CAT considers the new target to be conservative as we project China will already achieve it under its current policies and market trends.

China’s accompanying energy system plan introduced additional targets, including raising the electrification rate from 30% in 2025 to 35% by 2030, increasing the share of non-fossil energy in power generation to 50% by 2030, and increasing the share of wind and solar in total installed capacity to 50% by 2030. Current projections suggest that most of these goals are also likely to be achieved without significant additional policy effort, implying limited incremental ambition beyond ongoing structural trends in the energy system.

Recent oil market volatility has exposed short-term price pressures for China, given its high dependence on imports via the Strait of Hormuz. However, its substantial strategic reserves, stable coal power capacity, and rising electrification underpin its longer-term resilience. At the same time, continued reliance on coal as a fallback in the power sector remains a significant structural challenge and is misaligned with its long-term transition goals.

China has revised its methodology to calculate the allowed emissions under the intensity target in ways that weaken target stringency and increase uncertainty in tracking progress. The new approach expands coverage to include additional industrial-process emissions (notably in the declining cement sector) while excluding emissions from non-energy fossil fuel use (notably in the fast-growing chemical industry).

While the CAT calculations on current policies remain unaffected because they rely on independent, source-specific data and we use the same boundaries for all countries. The revisions do not undermine observed progress in energy transition and electrification; these accounting changes create scope for continued expansion of coal-to-chemicals industries without corresponding constraints from climate targets.

China’s plateauing emissions trajectory reflects its progress in clean technology, driven by expanding renewable energy in the power sector and deeper electrification across end-use sectors:

• Energy transition investment and supply chain leadership: China’s clean energy sector contributed over one third of the country's total economic growth in 2025. It remained the global leader in energy transition investment, reaching USD 800 billion. China also dominates key supply chains, producing over 80% of solar panels, 60% of wind turbines, and 75% of EVs and their batteries worldwide.
• Rapid renewable energy expansion: China added a record 430 GW of wind and solar capacity in 2025, bringing total renewable capacity, including hydropower, to 2,395 GW. The share of renewables in power generation rose from 28% in 2020 to 37% in 2025, while coal’s share declined from 63% to 54%.
• Towards electrification: electricity is providing an increasing share of final energy use in China, displacing fossil fuels. The electrification rate rose from 23% in 2015 to 30% in 2025 in China, while in the US and OECD Europe, it has stagnated at 22-23%. China’s latest energy plan targets electricity to account for 35% of final energy consumption by 2030, achieving the COP31 presidency’s global electrification goal five years early. Combined with cleaner power generation, this acceleration in electrification is central to enabling deep and long-term decarbonisation.
• EV leadership: just the expansion of EVs drove 16% of electrification-led fossil fuel displacement in China in 2023. In 2025, EVs captured over 50% market shares and made up 12% of all vehicles on the road in China. Their market share continued to rise, reaching a record 63% in May 2026.

Meanwhile, fossil fuels, particularly coal, remain dominant in China’s power and industry sector, highlighting the need for further mitigation efforts to align emissions with its 2060 carbon neutrality goal:

• Control and reduce fossil fuel dependence: despite declining coal demand in the power sector average utilisation rates falling below 50%, 291 GW of coal capacity remained in the pipeline in 2025. The government appears to be relying on a market-driven phase-down of coal rather than explicit regulatory targets. However, clear policy measures and targeted incentives to cap new coal capacity and total coal consumption during the 15th FYP period will be essential to prevent carbon lock-in and avoid stranded assets.
• Accelerate green transition of high-emitting industries: emission reductions in China’s cement and steel sectors are largely demand-driven rather than the result of structural decarbonisation. The transition to green industry is becoming increasingly urgent as global trade becomes more carbon-constrained, particularly under policies such as the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM). Accelerated technological innovation and stronger policy incentives during the 15th FYP period will be critical to decarbonising industry and strengthening the green competitiveness of Chinese industrial products.
• Enhance the national emission trading scheme (ETS): the national ETS expanded to include the cement, steel, and aluminium sectors in 2025, with plans to cover all major emissions-intensive industries by 2027 and full coverage of high-emitting sectors by 2035. Its effectiveness will depend on the stringency of the emissions cap and the design of allowance allocation, both of which will remain under development until 2030.
• Enhance mitigation of non-CO₂ gases, especially methane: The inclusion of all GHGs in China’s 2035 NDC marks progress beyond the earlier CO₂-focused peaking target. However, dedicated measures to reduce non-CO₂ emissions, particularly coal mine methane, will be necessary to deliver substantive mitigation beyond CO₂. China’s 15th FYP calls for non-CO2 GHG control projects covering methane, nitrous oxide, and hydrofluorocarbons in coal mining, agriculture, waste, and chemical sectors, targeting a reduction of 30 Mt of CO₂e.

The CAT ratings compare country’s targets and policies to (1) its fair share contribution to climate change mitigation considering a range of equity principles including responsibility, capability and equality, and (2) what is technically and economically feasible using modelled domestic pathways which are based on global least-cost climate change mitigation.

Comparing a country’s fair share ranges and modelled domestic pathways provides insights into which governments should provide climate finance and which should receive it. Developed countries with large responsibility for historical emissions and high per-capita emissions, must not only implement ambitious climate action domestically but must also support climate action in developing countries with lower historical responsibility, capability, and lower per-capita emissions.

While China emits over one-third of global CO₂, it is also the world’s factory, producing more than one-third of global manufactured goods (IEA, 2024; Norton, 2024). Our calculations follow a production-based approach, which does not reflect the role of international trade in driving China’s emissions. According to the Global Carbon Budget, China’s 2023 consumption-based CO₂ emissions are about 11% (or 1.3 GtCO2) lower than its territorial emissions (Global Carbon Budget, 2025).

The CAT rates China’s climate targets and policies as “Highly insufficient.” This rating indicates that China’s climate policies and commitments are not consistent with the Paris Agreement’s 1.5°C temperature limit.

China is not meeting its fair share contribution to climate change mitigation. China’s unconditional NDC and policies and action are rated as “Insufficient” compared to its fair share. China’s unconditional NDC is rated as “Highly insufficient” compared with modelled domestic pathways.

Although progress in the power sector’s clean transition helps China achieve a downward emissions trend, the country should adopt more concrete and ambitious policies to accelerate its shift away from fossil fuels, in order to contribute sufficiently to the 1.5°C goal.

The CAT estimates China’s total GHG emissions may have peaked in 2025 at 14.8 GtCO₂e (excl. LULUCF) if the downward emissions trajectory continues in the future. This is largely driven by record renewable deployment, which has kept pace with rising electricity demand, constrained coal-fired generation, and reduced CO₂ emissions in the power sector. The closure of the straight of Hormuz has accelerated this trend.

Under current policies, emissions are projected to decline thereafter, reaching 13.7–14.4 GtCO₂e by 2030 and 11.2–14.2 GtCO₂e by 2035. These projections are lower than previous assessments, reflecting updated targets in the 15th FYP and revisions to historical emissions data by PRIMAP.

China’s rapid renewable deployment is a central driver of power sector decarbonisation. In 2025, a record 430 GW of wind and solar capacity was added, raising total capacity to 1,840 GW. However, continued fossil expansion creates a structural tension. By end-2025, 291 GW of coal capacity remained in the pipeline, despite declining coal demand in the power sector, increasing the risk of carbon lock-in and stranded assets.

Emissions in industry, transport, and buildings are stabilising or declining. This reflects rising EV uptake in transport, reduced cement and steel output, and deepened electrification and efficiency improvements in building operations.

However, the pace of China’s energy transition remains insufficient to align with limiting warming to 1.5°C. China’s overall policies and action rating remains “Insufficient.”

The full policies and action analysis can be found here.

Under China’s NDC targets, the country’s emission levels would reach 14.4 GtCO2e in 2030 and 13.7 GtCO2e in 2035, equivalent to reductions of 2% and 7% respectively compared with 2025 levels. These projections are based on the median values of the CAT's conservative and optimistic estimates from the two most binding energy-related NDC targets.

The CAT keeps its rating of China’s 2030 NDC target against modelled domestic pathways as “Highly Insufficient,” indicating that its 2030 domestic targets need substantial improvements to be consistent with the 1.5°C temperature limit.

China’s emission levels under its NDC commitments are higher than what would be deemed 1.5°C compatible compared to our “fair share” approach. The CAT maintains its rating of China’s NDC targets against its fair share as “Insufficient.” This rating takes into account the fact that China has effectively submitted an unconditional NDC target but has not indicated a level of emissions that would be achieved with international support (a conditional NDC target).

China’s President Xi Jinping first announced China’s commitment to reach “carbon neutrality before 2060” in a declaration at the UN General Assembly in September 2020. China has since officially submitted a long-term strategy (LTS) to the UNFCCC in October 2021. As the formulation of the LTS submission does not meet the majority of the CAT’s criteria for a best-practice approach, we find China’s net zero target to be “Poor.”